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Priority No. 13

Case No. 940140 -- CA

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to consider this case pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (Supp. 1994), which

grants this

court original appellate jurisdiction over appeals from "orders on
petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the
Board of Pardons."

Walker was originally committed to the Utah

State Prison on a second-degree felony; therefore, this Court has
jurisdiction.

1

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court apply the correct standard of review to
Walker's Petition for Extraordinary Writ.

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE
This issue could not have been preserved, because Walker's
writ is not a "quasi-appellate review".

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is a legal conclusion that this court
can review for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah
1994),

Termunde v. Cookf 786 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990).

STATUTES
All relevant statutes are attached to this brief in Addendum
A.

REQUEST FOR WRITTEN OPINION AND NO ORAL ARGUMENT
The Appellee requests only a written opinion.

This is not a

case of first impression that has not been ruled on before.

The

writ process is, pursuant to both case law and U.S. and Utah
Constitutions, not an appeal, or a "quasi-appellate review".

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Walker filed this petition for extraordinary relief after the
Board of Pardons and Parole revoked his parole on August 3, 1993.
An evidentiary hearing was held wherein Walker was charged with the
parole violation of aggravated robbery. Following an Evidentiary
Hearing, the Board of Pardons found (on August 3, 1993) that Walker
committed the offense of Aggravated Robbery.
Walker was originally convicted of the offense of Aggravated
Robbery, but the conviction was reversed, and a new trial ordered.
The criminal court, Judge Glenn Iwasaki,

subsequently dismissed

the criminal charges.
Walker did plead guilty to failure to reside at his listed
address, which is a technical violation of parole.
Prior to the robbery conviction being overturned, (February
25, 1993),

and prior to the trial court dismissing the robbery

charge, Walker did plead guilty, at a parole hearing,

to having

been convicted of aggravated robbery, and having been convicted of
an habitual criminal offense.
Following the dismissal by the criminal trial court, the Board
of pardons filed a new charge against Walker: having committed the
offense of aggravated robbery.

Walker plead not guilty to this

charge and an evidentiary hearing was scheduled, the result of
which was to find Walker guilty of aggravated robbery.
Walker's Rule 65B petition for extraordinary writ was filed,
3

claiming that there was not sufficient evidence to find he had
committed
evidence.

aggravated robbery, even by a preponderance of the
(see Writ, point 4, page 2).

The transcripts of the Evidentiary Hearing were attached to
the writ, but not the criminal trial transcript, because, by
stipulation of counsel, the entire criminal trial transcript was
never admitted into evidence at the Evidentiary Hearing, only that
portion of the trial transcript which dealt with the testimony of
Toni Christensen and Rex Christensen. (See R. -

"B Transcript

Testimony from Criminal Trial11 and also transcript of Evidentiary
Hearing,

page

37,

and

page

197,

ff ,

Id

simply

submit

Toni

Christensen's testimony..").
In his writ, Walker provided complete evidence to Judge
Iwasaki, who was already familiar with the criminal robbery charge,
having heard been the judge who the matter at the criminal trial
level.
The trial court granted Walker's writ, as to the aggravated
robbery charge, finding that there was insufficient evidence before
the Board of Pardons for the Board to convince Walker of aggravated
robbery.

The trial court examined the finding of guilty by the

Board, "in light of the standard used by the Board of Pardons".
See minute entry dated 11-30-93, and attached hereto as Addendum
C.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Board of Pardons held an evidentiary hearing on the charge
4

of aggravated robbery, on February 25, 1993 and March 22, 1993.
At the criminal
Christensen

had

given

trial, held before Judge
testimony

damaging

to

Iwasaki, Tony

Walker. At the

evidentiary hearing only the trial transcript as it related to the
testimony of Tony Christensen and Rex Christensen was admitted into
evidence.

The entire trial transcript was never admitted into

evidence. See evidentiary transcript, page 37, and page 197, "I'd
simply submit Toni Christensen's testimony..").
Amended Findings of the Board (See R. -

In addition the

"B Transcript Testimony

from Criminal Trial1) indicate that the only portion of the trial
transcript considered was the testimony of Tony Christensen.
However, at the evidentiary hearing, an affidavit from Tony
Christensen
testimony.

was

introduced

which

recanted

the

earlier

trial

In addition, there was testimony from witnesses James

Esparza, (an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of
Utah), who testified that Tony Christensen had recanted her trial
testimony, (see transcript of evidentiary at page 233, 234, 235)
Robert Archuleta, (an attorney licensed to practice law in the
state of Utah), also testified that Tony Christensen had recanted
her testimony to him. (see transcript of evidentiary hearing at
page 254)
The

Board

specifically

disregarded

the

eyewitness

identification testimony, from witness who had been employed by
Taco Bell. (R. 16-17).

However, even though the Board found that

the eyewitness testimony
"findings" relied

on the

should be disregarded, much
"disregarded"
5

testimony,

of the

as to the

descriptions and identification of Walker.
The Board,s findings of fact were flawed and not sufficient
to support a finding of guilty, even at the preponderance level,
for example:
1. The "Finding" that two days before the robbery Walker asked
Toni Christensen to get him a gun was not supported at any level of
evidence at the evidentiary hearing.

The gun was not introduced,

Walker did not testify and Tony Christensen's testimony had been
recanted. Linda Rice testified at the evidentiary hearing that she
was in St. George at the time period of the events of the robbery,
and no evidence was introduced to disprove or discredit her
testimony. ( T of evidentiary at 179). The finding was based upon
the trial transcript testimony of Tony Christensen only.
2. The "Finding" regarding the silver-colored revolver was not
based upon any information produced at the evidentiary hearing.
3. The testimony of the employees of the Taco Bell was
specifically determined to be "tainted"

(R 16-17), the Board

disregarded all evidence of eyewitness identification, and yet
somehow

"found"

(R-13)

that

Walker

matched

the

robber's

description, even though the robber wore a mask and no evidence was
introduced (and subsequently accepted) to identify Walker as the
robber.
4. The Board's findings included the fact that it was the
practice of Taco Bell employees to place loose change in rolls
wrapped

in "Taco Bell" wrappers, and yet no "wrappers" were

introduced and no evidence was introduced linking Walker to a Taco
6

Bell wrapper.
5. The Board's findings included the fact that the robber
drove away in a car identified as belong to Thomas Bridwell, the
brother of Walker's girlfriend, Linda Rice.

However, no evidence

was ever introduced linking Walker to the car which the robber
drove away. No fingerprints were introduced linking Walker to the
car and no witness was introduced who ever saw Walker drive the
car, at any time.
The state's Brief at page eight states that "Shelly Manwell
testified...." Shelly Manwell never testified at Walker's trial, no
testimony of "Shelly Manwell" was admitted to the evidentiary
hearing, and the Findings of Fact do not mention Shelly Manwell.
Shelly Manwell did not testify at Walker's evidentiary hearing.
The Brief of the State is factually inaccurate in regards to Shelly
Manwell. There is no cite to the record because there is no record
to support the state's representation.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Appellant would ask the court to change the availability
and application of the writ, and make it an appeal's review
process.
the

writ

To grant such relief would be to change the essence of
process.

The

Declaration

of

Rights

of

the

Utah

Constitution, Article I, section 5, specifically prohibits such
restrictions of relief.
The trial court (Judge Iwasaki)

correctly found that even

using the "preponderance level" there was insufficient evidence to
7

convince Walker of aggravated robbery.

The trial court examined

the entire transcript of the evidentiary hearing, and was familiar
with the criminal trial, because Judge Iwasaki was the judge at the
criminal trial, in which the charges were dismissed. Judge Iwasaki
was familiar with the case, and able to make a fair review of the
evidentiary hearing, and more able than any other individual to
compare the trial court testimony of Tony Christensen, to the
affidavits submitted at the evidentiary hearing, and the testimony
of attorney's Esparza and Archuleta, as well as the testimony of
Linda Rice.
Walker's rule 65 B petition is not a request for an appellatestyle review, and there is no support, either statutory or in case
law, to sustain Appellant's contention that trial courts are
appeal's

court's

extraordinary writ.

for

the

purposes

of

examination

of

an

Walker's writ is a claim of violation of due

process. However, even if it had been an appellate review, Walker
did marshal evidence to support and demonstrate clear error on the
part of the Board.
Walker provided the trial court with a complete record,
because the entire trial transcript was never admitted.

The

state's claim that the Board's decision was made on the entire
trial transcript is unsupported.

However, if the Board did make

it's decision based upon the entire trial transcript there was
clear error, even without the transcript being submitted, because
the entire transcript was never admitted into evidence.
Even if the trial court's burden was to make a determination
8

as to whether or not the findings established the elements of
aggravated robbery by the constitutional burden of proof applicable
to the revocation proceedings, then the trial court met it's
burden. The trial court found that it's decision to grant the writ
was made in "the light of the standard used by the Board of
Pardons" (Minute entry 11-30-93, paragraph 5 ) .
The trial court (in hearing writs) is not the Utah court of
Appeals and counsel for the Appellants did not cite to one Utah
code section, or case, to support such a contention.

ARGUMENT
THE WRIT PROCESS CANNOT BE CHANGED TO A
"QUASI-APPELLATE" REVIEW
The writ process is special and The Declaration of Rights of
the Utah Constitution, Article I, section 5, expressly prohibits
restrictions on the availability of the Writ except "when the
public safety requires it." That provision states:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the
public safety requires it.
This
identical

provision
to

Constitution.

of

Article

the
I,

Utah

Constitution

section

Appellant's brief

9

of

the

is essentially
United

States

sets forth the concept that the

trial court is only a "quasi-appellate" review body of the Board's
revocation proceedings.

Such a notion essentially suspends the

writ process for Walker, and limits the writ to an appellate review
process only.

Appellant's contention that the writ is simply a
9

11

quasi-appellate review" totally ignores the concept and purpose of

a writ, which is to examine a situation and grant relief "where no
other plain speedy and adequate remedy is available". Rule 65B(a),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
As a general matter, a writ of habeas corpus is not a
substitute for an appeal, especially for ordinary types of trial
error that are not likely to affect the outcome of a trial. Bundy
v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 804 (Utah 1988); Andrews v. Shulsen, 94
Utah Adv.

Rep. 11 (October 27, 1988); Wells v. Shulsen. 747 P.2d

1043 (Utah 1987); Codianna v.

Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983);

If, by case law, the writ is not a substitute for appeal, then
Walker could hardly have declared it so, when he filed his writ.
Appellant contends that the decision of the Board is res judicata,
and that the writ is simply a "quasi-appellate review".
Protection

of

life

and

liberty

from

unconstitutional

procedures is of greater importance than is res judicata.

In

Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963), the United States
Supreme Court emphasized the point by stating: "Conventional
notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or
liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is
alleged. . . . The inapplicability of res judicata to habeas . . .
is inherent in the very role and function of the writ."
In discussing the importance of the writ, the Supreme Court of
Utah held in Martinez v. Smith. 602 P.2d 700 (Utah 1979), (Chief
Justice Crockett, writing for the Court), stated: "Nevertheless,

10

however desirable it may be to adhere to the rules, the law should
not be so blind and unreasoning that where an injustice has
resulted the [defendant) should be without remedy." Martinez, at
702.
An extraordinary writ, is not a request for appellate review.
In Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121, 122-23 (1967),
the court observed "This proceeding is an attempt to do that which
should not be done nor countenanced in our procedure: to turn
habeas corpus into an appellate review."

And, just as in Bryant,

the Appellant attempts to do what the U.S. and Utah Constitutions,
as well as case law specifically prohibit, that is turn a writ into
an appellate review. A writ is either granted or denied, and then
there may be an appellate review of that decision, but a writ is
not

a

appellate

review,

nor

is

a

writ

a

"quasi-appellate

review".

WALKER DID NOT REQUEST THE TRIAL COURT TO CONDUCT AN
APPELLATE REVIEW
Walker never requested the trial court to conduct an appellate
review, and such a contention is simply not supported by the
record.

Appellant makes the unsupported pronouncement and then

cites to In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1986) at
page 1360.

However, in Jones, a Writ of Certiorari was filed,

pursuant to Rules 65B(b)(2) and 65B(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Rule 65B (e) (failing to comply with duty), does not apply
because the issue was appeal of an unfair discharge. The court held
11

that the proper application was subject to Rule 65B (e). Appellant
compares apples and oranges. In re Discharge of Jones, involves a
specific application of Rule 65B (e) because of the nature of the
litigation.

It was not a parole violation hearing or a writ which

dealt with the Board of Pardons.
regarding his contention

Not one of Appellant's cites

that Walker's petition requested an

appellate review dealt with a writ involving a review of the Board
of Pardons. Certainly other writs have been filed and reviewed in
the state of Utah prior to Walker, which involve the Board of
Pardons, in which the standard of review was discussed.
In Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1992), the court
addressed the standard of review to be applied by the trial court,
in extraordinary writs, and held that the trial court must apply
the "law to the facts" and make a determination. Judge Iwasaki made
a specific finding that he made his determination "in the light of
the standard used by the Board of Pardons" (See Minute entry 11 30-93 addendum C).

Judge Iwasaki applied the law to the facts, and

made the appropriate determination.
Appellant's contention that Walker failed to marshal the
evidence is, at the least, misleading,
Iwasaki

was the trial

testimony.

and flatly untrue.

judge who heard

Judge

all of the original

In addition, the entire transcript was, by stipulation

of both counsel, never admitted into evidence. See transcript of
evidentiary, pages page 37, and page 197.

Appellant assumes

(incorrectly) that the Board's decision was based solely on the
criminal trial testimony and "not the two days of hearing and
12

affidavits before the board11.
Appellant's brief.

See footnote 4, page 11 of the

If such a statement were true, then the Board

may be guilty of an even greater charge of abuse of discretion, and
abuse of due process, if they actually held two days of evidentiary
hearings, involving at least five attorney's many witnesses and
then simply ignored the two days of hearing and evidence, and based
it's decision solely on a document which was never even admitted
into evidence.
Such an assumption is unsupported
by Walker

by the evidence submitted

(the transcript of the evidentiary hearing).

The

evidence marshalled by Walker and examined by the judge, but
apparently never read in it's entirety

by the Appellant.

Appellant also cites to Crockett v Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820
(Utah App. 1992), to support his contention that Judge Iwasaki
should have presumed the findings of the Board to be accurate and
complete.

The point of Walker's writ was that the findings were

not based upon the record of the evidentiary hearing, and Walker
then supplied the trial court the transcript of the hearing.

The

Appellant's reliance on Crockett is confusing.
Crockett is a case decided by the Utah Court of Appeals,
dealing with custody and divorce. Crockett is not a writ and does
not address the special aspects of a writ.

Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure 65B (a) is clear that an extraordinary writ is available
"when no other plain speedy and adequate remedy is available". In
Jrockett, the issue was custody/divorce, there was a trial and then
an appeal was filed. To compare Crockett to Walker's writ and then
13

conclude that Walker failed to marshal1 the evidence and that the
writ should have been denied is not on point, and is confusing and
misleading.
Judge Iwasaki stated that he had examined the transcripts,
court file (see Order dated February 10, 1994, paragraph 12), but
also reminded counsel at the hearing held January 24, 1994 that he
was the trial judge who dismissed the charges, and knew the case
very well.
Appellant's argument hinges on his assumption that the trial
court was bound to assume the "accuracy of the Board's findings"
(Appellant's brief at 13), because Walker failed to marshall the
entire trial transcript. The whole writ process, by definition is
begun when one does not "accept" the findings of the Board.

In

addition, the entire trial transcript was never admitted into
evidence, and the portions that were admitted were well described
and discussed in the body of the evidentiary hearing. Walker could
hardly be responsible to attach a document to his writ that was
never admitted into evidence.
The Appellant contends that the trial court is merely the
Appeals court and must act as such. However, unconstitutional the
concept, it also flies in the face of available case law. The Utah
Court of Appeals has set forth instructions in other cases, which
are on point and deal specifically with the trial court's purpose
and charge in hearing writs which deal with the Board of Pardons.
In Foote v. Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), the Utah
Supreme Court examined Foot's writ and made a determination that
14

each case (involving the Board) must be examined individually (by
the trial court) and that the "facts concerning the procedures
followed by the board are flushed out,".

The Supreme Court then

determined that, as a court of appeal, it was unable to "conduct a
meaningful review of the board's actions or of petitioner's due
process claims."

Foote. 808 P.2d at 735. The Utah Supreme Court

then referred the matter, (not back to the Utah Court of Appeals) ,
but to the "district court of Salt Lake County for appropriate
proceedings."

Id.

Those "appropriate proceedings" were for the

trial court flush out the facts concerning Foot's case and make
findings based upon it's determination.

The trial court was not

given the instruction to conduct an appeals-type review of the
Board, but to "flush out" the facts. That job falls to the appeals
court system, not the trial court.

Judge Iwasaki "flushed out"

the facts in Walker's case and then made a decision.
The Utah Supreme Court thus confirmed in Foote v. Board of
Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991) that the purpose of the district,
or trial court, is not to function as a court of appeals.
The Appellant has not presented a case of first impression in
which there has not been an opinion issued.

If the question has

not been asked before - it is because the answer was already plain
on it's face.

The Utah Supreme Court could not have sent the

matter back to the "district court.... for appropriate proceedings"
if the district court were simply a "quasi-appellate review"
entity. Id.
Other courts have examined the standards which should be
15

applied to trial court's which either grant or deny writs. The writ
is older than the U.S. and Utah constitutions, and has historically
been treated by the trial court's a a request for a re-examination
of a case. Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121, 122-23
(1967) (citations omitted); see also Gallegos v. Turner, 17 Utah 2d
273, 409 P.2d 386, 387 (Utah 1989) (judgment not subject to attack
except in the most unusual circumstances such as where "it would be
wholly unconscionable not to re-examine conviction").

Similar

language is also found in Hurst, Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035
(Utah 1989), "[A] conviction may nevertheless be challenged by
collateral attack in 'unusual circumstances,' that is where an
obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a
constitutional right has occurred." Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1035.
However, even if Walker had asked the trial curt to conduct a
"quasi-appellate review", the same result would have been entered,
which is to grant the writ.

Pursuant to

Ward v. Smith, 573 P.2d

781, 782 (Utah 1978), "The plenary authority of the Board of
Pardons should not be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of
its rightful discretion."

However, Judge Iwasaki clearly noted

that he examined the facts, "in the light of the standard used by
the board of pardons", and that the evidence was "Insufficient and
conflicting". (Minute entry dated 11-30-93, paragraph 5) Clearly,
Ward does not stand for the theory that the Board's decisions can
never be disturbed, but that they should not be disturbed absent a
clear abuse of discretion.

Judge Iwasaki examined the evidence,

16

and made a finding that there was insufficient and conflicting
evidence to find Walker guilty even at the level of preponderance
used by the Board. The trial court's decision in Walker's case is
not in conflict with Appellant's cite to Ward. Judge Iwasaki found
that there was no substance to the evidence.

The Appellant has

made no showing that the findings of Judge Iwasaki were flawed.
Even though Judge Iwasaki used the same level (preponderance)
to examine Walker's charge, that the Board used, some of the Utah's
surrounding states have held that the preponderance level is
inappropriate when alleging that a parolee has committed a crime
for which he has not been convicted. Our sister state Colorado has
even affirmed that position in both case law and statute:
when a parolee pleads not guilty to a parole
complaint alleging commission of a crime for which
been convicted, then the authority seeking parole
has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable
the parolee committed the alleged offense"
People v. White, 804

violation
he has not
revocation
doubt that

P.2d 247 (Colo.App. 1990). Thus, it may

be possible that should Utah's preponderance rule be put to the
test in the federal courts, (alleging a parole violation which is
the commission of a crime for which the parolee has not been
convicted), it would be found to be an violation of due process.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE APPEAL'S COURT IS TO
REVIEW FOR CORRECTNESS
The

standard

of

review

for reviewing

a dismissal, (or

granting), of a habeas corpus petition is outlined in Waastaff v.
17

Barnes, 802 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Bundy v.
Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988)):
In reviewing an appeal from a dismissal of a habeas
corpus petition, "we survey the record in the light
most favorable to the findings and judgment; and we
will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein
to support the trial court's refusal to be convinced
that the writ should be granted.
In Hall v. Utah Board of Pardons, 806 P.2d 217, 217 (Utah App.
1991), this court found stated "[w]e will not reverse if the is a
reasonable basis in the record to support the trial court's denial
of the writ." It is also logical, that the process will not be
reversed if there was a reasonable basis to grant the writ.
Appellate court of other states have applied similar language
in reviewing either a denial or grant of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. See Sheriff of Clark County v Spaanola, 706 p.2d
840, 842 (Nev. 1985) (limited to a review of whether district court
committed substantial error in granting relief).
Under the Utah Constitution, the due process clause of
article I, section 7 is "comprehensive in its application to all
activities of state government." Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons. 808
P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991). What process is due in any given
circumstance may vary, "but assuredly, the parole board is not
outside the constitutional mandate that the actions of government
must afford due process of law."
of pardons hearing

Id.

The process due at a board

can only be determined

"after the facts

concerning the procedures followed by the board are flushed [sic]
out." Foote, 808 P.2d at 735.
18

On review of a denial of a petition for an extraordinary writ,
the standard of review depends upon the issues presented on appeal.
If the petition presents only questions of law, the court of
Appeal's

grants

the trial

court's

reviewing them for correctness.

conclusions

no deference,

Stewart v. State By and Through

Deland, 830 P.2d 306, 309 (Utah App. 1992).
If, however, there are questions of fact, "we defer to the
trial court's findings and will disturb those findings only if they
are clearly erroneous." Id. Moreover, the record is viewed in the
light most favorable to the findings and judgment, and if there is
a reasonable basis to support the trial court's refusal to grant
habeas corpus relief, then the Appeals court will affirm the trial
court.

Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); accord

Baldwin v. State, 842 P.2d 927, 928 (Utah App. 1992).
This court should review the findings of the trial court and
affirm, unless the findings are clearly erroneous, if the court had
been asked to review the writ.

However, Appellant has requested

the court to make a determination as to whether or not the writ
process is a "quasi-appellate review".

In this case, the court

should determine that the writ process is not an appellate review,
because of case law and constitutional prohibitions.

CONCLUSION
The narrow question presented to the Utah Court of Appeals in
Walker's case is whether or not the trial court should have (or
could have) examined Walker's writ requesting extraordinary relief
19

from a Board Of Pardons decision in a "quasi-appellate review"
manner.

The

answer

is

that

both

the

U.S.

and

the

Utah

Constitutions specifically define an individual's right to seek
relief via the writ process, as a special process set aside from
the appeal's system, and case law in many states, and specifically
in Utah have historically held that a writ is not an appeal and
that the purpose of the writ process, at the trial court level, is
to is to flush out the facts.
The Appellant's request for relief should be denied.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^_>/_ day of February, 1995.

Bt&KELOCK
attorney for Thayne Walker
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CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to:
James Beadles, 330 South

300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,

on this 27th day of February, 1995.

££^
Rosemond Blakelock
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A

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of
committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined
in Section 76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be
considered to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it
occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.

(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead
Corporation
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FEE 1 C 1994
LORENZO K. MILLER (5761)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
330 South 300 East, Second Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2525
Telephone: (801) 575-1600
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THAYNE LARRY WALKER,
ORDER
Petitioner,

:

v.

:

THE STATE OF UTAH, et al..

:

Case No. 930904964 HC
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
Respondents.

:

The above-entitled matter came before this court on November
11, 1993 and January 24, 1994. Respondents were represented by
Lorenzo K. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, and Petitioner was
present and represented by Rosemond G. Blakelock.

The court,

having entered its ruling by minute entry on November 30, 1993,
now makes the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1.

Petitioner is lawfully imprisoned at the Utah State

Prison for the crimes of robbery, a second degree felony and
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third
degree felony.

These sentences are running consecutively.

nnnRQ

2.

Petitioner's sentences of imprisonment will not expire

until November 2010.
3.

On July 25, 1989, Petitioner was paroled from the

prison by order of the Utah Board of Pardons.
4.

On February 25, 1993, Petitioner received a parole

revocation hearing before the Board that was continued on March
29, 1993/ at which time, the Board heard testimony and received
evidence on the allegations that Petitioner had violated his
Parole Agreement.
5.

Subsequently, the Board found Petitioner

guilty of

violating his Parole Agreement by having committed the offense of
aggravated robbery and by having failed to reside at his
residence of record.
6.

The Board revoked Petitioner's parole date and ordered

his re-incarceration at the prison based upon the violations.
7.

Written findings and conclusions were prepared by the

Board detailing and explaining the Board's decision.
8.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

on or about September 2, 1993, challenging the actions of the
Board in revoking his parole.
9.

An evidentiary hearing was held before this court on

November 11, 1993.
10.

On November 30, 1993, this court issued a minute entry
2

00090

denying in part and granting in part, Respondents' Motion to
Dismiss.
11.

Respondents' counsel, Lorenzo K. Miller, requested a

hearing and clarification on the minute entry of November 30,
1993.

Accordingly, on January 24, 1994, the court clarified its

minute entry.
12.

The court found, after examination of the transcripts,

the court's file, and counsels' arguments, that there was
insufficient and evidence before the Board to find that
Petitioner committed the crime of aggravated robbery.
13.

Specifically, the court found that the affidavits and

testimony from Toni Christensen and Linda Rice conflicted with
the testimony at trial and based upon those conflicts, the Board
had insufficient evidence to conclude Petitioner committed the
offense of aggravated robbery.
14.

However, based on the uncontested admissions of

Petitioner, the court found sufficient evidence for the Board to
revoke Petitioner's parole based upon the violation of failing to
reside at a residence of record.
Having made the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, the
court orders the following:
1.

Respondents' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and

denied in part.

3

2.

Petitioner's requested relief is granted in part and

denied in part.
3.

The Board shall reconsider Petitioner's case in light

of the court's ruling-* and shall act accordingly.
DATED this

I (/

day of February, 1994.
BY

THE^CDURTJ

HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI
Third District Court

CERTIFICATg QF

mibWG

I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid to David S. Steed.

zr<L
203 South 1920 West, Provo, UT
1994.

84601, this O

day of February,

Ti^L
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
WALKER, THAYNE L
PLAINTIFF

vs
STATE OF UTAH DEPT OF CORRECTI
DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 930904964 HC
DATE 11/30/93
HONORABLE GLENN K IWASAKI
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK KRB

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. BLAKELOCK, ROSEMOND G.
D. ATTY. MILLER, LORENZO K

AND WAS A DECISION REACHED BY THE BOARD WILL WITHIN THEIR
DISCRETIONARY POWERS, NOT SUBJECT TO COURT REVIEW;
6) WHAT EVER ALTERNATIVE RELIEF PETITIONER WOULD REQUEST OF
THE BOARD PURSUANT TO THIS DECISION IS UP TO HIM.
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS IS DENIED IN PART AND
GRANTED IN PART.
MR. MILLER IS DIRECTED TO PREPARE THE OR©3R.

<>.

to J O

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
WALKER, THAYNE L
PLAINTIFF

VS
STATE OF UTAH DEPT OF CORRECTI
DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 930904964 HC
DATE 11/30/93
HONORABLE GLENN K IWASAKI
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK KRB

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. BLAKELOCK, ROSEMOND G.
D. ATTY. MILLER, LORENZO K

THIS MATTER'WAS HEARD BY THE COURT ON 11/15/93 9 9 AM.
PETITIONER WAS PRESENT AND REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, ROSEMOND
BLAKELOCK; RESPONDENT WAS REPRESENTED BY ASSISTANT AG,
LORENZO MILLER. AFTER HEARING ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES ON
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, THE COURT TOOK THE MATTER UNDER
ADVISEMENT IN ORDER TO EXAMINE EXHIBITS "A" AND "B" OF THE
PETITION. EXHIBIT "A" IS THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PETITIONER'S
EVID. HEARING HELD 2/25/93; EXHIBIT "B" IS THE TRANSCRIPT OF
THE PETITIONER'S EVID. HEARING OF 5/29/93. AFTER FURTHER REVIEW
OF THE TRANSCRIPTS, THE FILE AND THE ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL, THE
COURT FINDS:
1) PETITIONER IS LAWFULLY CONFINED AT THE USP FOR THE CRIMES
OF ROBBERT A 2ND DEGREE FELONY AND POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS
WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED PERSON, A 3RD DEGREE FELONY, THE
SENTENCE TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY;
2) PETITIONER'S SENTENCES WILL NOT EXPIRE UNTIL NOV., 2010;
3) THAT BEGINNING 2/25/93 AND CONTINUING ON 3/29/93, THE
BOARD TOOK EVIDENCE ON PETITIONER'S PAROLE OF 7/25/89 REGARDING
ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS AND POSSIBILITY OF REVOKING SAID
PAROLE;

4) PURSUANT TO SAID EVID. HEARING, THE BOARD FOUND
PETITIONER TO BE IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONDITIONS OF PAROLE, I.E.,
PETITIONER FAILED TO RESIDE AT A RESIDENCE OF RECORD AND
HAVING COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF AGG. ROBBERY AND REVOKED HIS
PREVIOSLY GRANTED PAROLE:
5) AFTER EXAMINATION OF THE TRANSCRIPTS, THE FILE AND
COUNSEL'S ARGUMENTS, THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT THERE WAS
INSUFFICIENT AND CONFLICTING EVIDENCE BEFORE THE BOARD TO FIND
THAT PETITIONER COMMITTED THE CRIME OF AGG. ROBBERY. THIS
FINDING IS MADE IN LIGHT OF THE STANDARD USED BY THE BOARD OF
PARDONS. HOWEVER, THE COURT FURTHER FINDS THAT PETITIONER
ADMITTED TO THE OTHER VIOLATION WHICH IN AND OF ITSELD ENABLED
THE BOARD TO REVOKE PETITIONER'S PAROLE DATE. THE DECISION TO
REVOKE WAS BASED UPON PETITIONER'S ADMISSION TO THE ALLEGATION

Case No: 930904964 HC
Certificate of Mailing
I certify that on the

30

day of

l^f?;,

, m^.

I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the
attached document to the following:
THAYNE L WALKER
Plaintiff

STATE OF UTAH DEPT OF CORRECTI
Defendant

ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK
Atty for Plaintiff
COTTON TREE SQUARE SUITE 9-D
2230 NORTH UNIVERSITY PARKWAY
PROVO UT 84604

SCOTT CARVER
Defendant

UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS
Defendant

M SIBBETT
Defendant

BOARD MEMBERS THEREOF
Defendant

LORENZO K MILLER
Atty for Defendant
330 SOUTH 300 EAST
2ND FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY,
UT 84111-252
District Court Clerk
By:

C(("?^L.

Deputy Clerk
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Hatter of the Alleged
Parole Violation of
THAYNE LARRY WALKER
USP #13057

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

INTRODUCTION
Thayne Larry Walker was charged with violating hie parole by (I) having
failed to reside at a residence of record, and (2) having committed the
offense of Aggravated Robbery. Mr. Walker pled guilty to the residence
violation and not guilty to the allegation of Aggravated Robbery, and an
Evidentiary Hearing was scheduled on this latter charge.
Ou February 25, 1993, the matter came on for hearing before the Board of
Pardons, and again on March 29, 1993, Board members sitting were Curtis L.
Garner and Cheryl Hansen. Parolee Thayne Walker was present and represented
by counsel Mark Stringer. The State was represented by Assistant Attorney
General Ralph Adam*. After hearing the evidence, the stipulations of the
parties and the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised herein, the
Board now finds Thayne Larry Walker in violation of his parole by having
failed to reside at a residence of record, and by having committed the offense
of Aggravated Robbery, and hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, which constitute the decision of the Board:

FIMDIHGS OF FACT
1. Thayne Larry Walker was paroled from the Utah State Prison on July
25, 1989.
2. On or about July 27, 1989, Thayne Larry Walker left his residence of
record without notifying Adult Probation and Parole, and thereafter failed to
notify Adult Probation and Parole of his residence.
3* On or about August 16, 1989, Thayne Larry Walker asked Toni
Christensen to get him a gun so that he could "make some money".
4. On or about August 16, 1989, and in response to Mr. Walker's request,
Toni Chriatensen rode with Mr. Walker and Mr. Walker'a girlfriend, Linda Rice,
to the home of Ms. Chrisleusen's father, in Murray, Utah. There she obtained
her fatherfs silver-colored revolver and gave it to Mr. Walker. THe three of
them traveled to this location in Linda Rico's blue Toyota automobile.
5. On
restaurant,
robber, who
height, had

or about August 18, 1939, at approximately 9:30 p.m., a Taco Bell
located at 4199 South Redwood Road, Murray, Utah, was robbed. The
was wearing a aki mask at the time, atood between 6V and 6'4" i * 0 0 0 1 r
blue ayea with wrinkles around them, light brown or sandy blond v v v *

6. During the robbery* the robber pointed his gun at Ms. Beid. Be told
her not to try anything or he would kill her. Be walked directly to the safe,
removed the lid, and retrieved a money bag, which contained mostly loose
change, fie then motioned with his gun for Ms. Reid to walk to the cash
register. She did so and gave him the money from the register. Be took it,
said "thank you," and ran from the restaurant out the back door.
7. At the time of the robbery it was the ordinary practice of Taco Bell
employees to place loose coins in rolls wrapped in 'Taco Bell1* paper, and then
to place these in the safe. It is probable, but not certain, that such rolls
were in the Taco Bell aafe at the time of the robbery.
8. Upon leaving the Taco Bell, the robber ran to a blue Toyota, Utah
license plate number 719BDP, and entered the passenger side. The car then
fled at a high rate of speed.
9. On the date of the robbery, Utah license plate number 719DP was
registered to a blue Toyota, owned by Thomas Bridwell.
10.

Thomas Bridwell is the brother of Linda Rice.

11. Linda Rice was and is Thayne Larry Walker's girlfriend.
regularly drove her brother's blue Toyota.

She

12. Thayne Larry Walker resided with Linda Rice following his absconsion
from parole supervision.
13. From observation at the hearing, the Board notes that Thayne Larry
Walker stands approximately 6 V 2" tall, has light brown or sandy blond hair,
and blue eyes with wrinkles around them.
14. At approximately 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. on August 18, 1989, Thayne Larry
Walker appeared at the apartment of Shelly Nanwell. He was carrying a
moneybag which contained coin rolls wrapped in plastic with 'Taco Bell11 on
them. He also carried the gun which he had received from Toni Chris tens en two
days previous. He was wearing levis and tennis shoes. He was vVet9>, appeared
nervous, entered the residence shortly thereafter and also appeared upset.
She stated that she felt "they" had been seen, and that aha had hidden her car.
15* To the extent that the testimony of any witness is not in accord
with the findings herein, it is not credited. Any Conclusion of Law which
should be deemed a Finding of Fact ia hereby adopted as such.
BV1DKNTIARI DISCUSSION
A.

gygwitngge Testification

At the hearing, defense counsel made two motions in limine relating to
State1s evidence of eyewitness identification.
First, the defense moved that the Board either recuse itself entirely in
this matter, or in the alternative that it bifurcate the hearing to make a
preliminary determination of the admissibility of eyewitness identification
testimony, and that those Board members Baking this initial determination then
recuse themselves from further sitting in this matter. Counsel cited State v.
fiAOilfili 817 P. 2d 774, 780-784 (Utah 1991), for the proposition that the
distinction between judge and jury must be preserved when dealing with the
foundation for eyewitness identification, and that the ultimate finder of fact
must not paas on questions of admissibility* This motion was denied.
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Next the defense moved to dismiss all charges against Thayne Larry
Walker. The motion was based on the argument that admission of eyewitness
testimony impermissibly tainted under Eanirar would constitute a violation of
due process, and that if such evidence were excluded, the State would have no
case. This motion was also denied.
During the hearing, and over defense objections, the Board allowed
eyewitnesses to the robbery to identify Thayne Larry Walker as the robber.
The Board permitted such testimony on the ground that (1) the Rsmlrtg
requirement of an independent determination as to admissibility applies to
jury, not bench trials; end (2) parole revocation hearings are "informal"
proceedings at which formal rules of evidence do not apply and in which any
evidentiary problems normally go to weight, rather than admissibility. At the
conclusion of the State's case* however9 the Board determined that the
eyewitness testimony was in fact impermissibly tainted by the witnesses1 prior
exposure, both live and photographic, to Mr. Walker. The Board therefore
disregarded all evidence of eyewitness identification in reaching it's
decision.

B

Transcript Tgctlnonv from Criminal Trial

At the outset of the hearing, defense counsel alio made a motion in
limine to suppress as hearsay all transcript testimony from Mr. Walker's
criminal trial. This motion was denied. Later, during the hearing, the Board
received into evidence transcripts of trial testimony by Toni Ghrietensen over
a renewed hearsay objection. This objection was overruled and the evidence
was received based upon (1) the admissibility of hearsay in parole violation
proceedings (Utah Admin. R. 671-508-(E))f and (2) the Board's finding that Ms.
Christensen was unavailable as a witness (Utah R. Evid., 604).

C.

Credibility of Ton! Christeneen Beer««y Documents

Following the admission of Toni Christensen's trial testimony, the Board
allowed the defense-to introduce a notarised affidavit by Ms. Christensen in
which she arguably contradicts her testimony at trial. In the affidavit, she
states that she had used drugs and alcohol at some unspecified time prior to
the trialt and that she testified as she did at the trial due to her fear of
possible criminal prosecution* The affidavit does not specify in what manner,
if any, her trial testimony was incorrect; rather, it merely states that ahe
could no longer recall the events of August, 1989.
A companion affidavit by attorney Robert Archuleta, as well as his
testimony at the hearing, amplifies somewhat on the Toni Christensen
affidavit. Mr, Archuleta atates that Toni Chris tensen told him that ahe was a
drug addict and was alcohol-intoxicated at the time of her trial testimony and
that she testified as she did at trial because ahe was mad at Linda Rice, ahe
feared criminal prosecution unless ahe cooperated, she feared losing her
children to the State if she did not cooperate, and she expected some form of
monetary compensation in exchange for her testimony.
The Board finds Ms. Christeneeu'e affidavit testimony to be less reliable
than that offered at trial. In making this determination, we consider a
number of factors:
Firstf the trial testimony was given in a courtroom eetting where the
'
witness1a demeanor was on display and where ahe was aubiect to examin***** K «

Second, the trial testimony is clear, detailed, and cones directly from
the mouth of the witness herself. The affidavit, by contrast, is brief,
somewhat vague and was drafted for her by Mr. Walkerfa criminal attorney.
Third, the trial testimony is consistent with an independant account
given by Ms. Christensen to Murray Police Detective Glover. The affidavit is
not*
Fourth, the affidavit was not executed until approximately 24 months
after the trial.
Fifth, Toni Christensen was hostile toward Linda Rice (Mr. Walker's
girlfriend) at the time of trial and was cross-examined concerning this. She
was further cross-examined regarding her drug and alcohol uee. By the time
she met with Mr. Walker1a attorney to prepare the affidavit, however, ahe had
reconciled with Ms. Rice to the point that Ms. Rice was present with her at
the time of the attorneyfs interview. Further, it was the impression of one
of the attorneys in attendance that the women had been drinking together for
an extended period* Thus a legitimate question ariaes whether Toni
Christensen was pressured into making the affidavit in a moment of imparled
judgment. Unfortunately, the State has had no opportunity to explore these
possibilities with the witness on cross-examination.
Rased upon these considerations, insofar as the trial testimony and
affidavit are in conflict, the Board finds the trial testimony more credible.

D. Credibility of Linda Rice
Defense witness Linda Rice testified at the hearing that ahe had no
independent knowledge of the August 18th Robbery, or of who committed it. The
Board finds this aspect of Ms. Rice's testimony lacking in credibility, baaed
upon at least three considerations;
First, Ms. Rice's demeanor at the hearing was unconvincing. During her
testimony, ahe avoided eye contact with the Board, frequently appeared
uncertain aa to how to testify, and seemed uncomfortable, shifting frequently
in her seat during cross-examination. Occasionally ahe would turn to look at
Mr. Walker before answering State counsel's questions.
Second, Ms. Rice has a motive to lie. She was herself originally charged
criminally along with Mr. Walker, and ahe admits that ahe wants their romance
to continue whenever he is released from prison.
Third, at least some of her testimony is implausible, which casts a cloud
of doubt upon the remainder. For example, her story that ahe never diecueaed
Toni Christensen's prior testimony with her, nor what Mr. Christensen might
say in a subsequent affidavit, strikes us aa highly unlikely, given Ms. Rice's
obvious interest and opportunity to discuss this.

CONCLUSION OF XAW
1.

Thayne Larry Walker was lawfully paroled.

2.

Thayne Larry Walker was charged with violation of hit parole.

3. Thayne Larry Walker waa afforded all of his Constitutional and
Statutory righta and privileges.
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4. The State has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that Larry Thayne Walker violated his parole*
3* Thayne Larry Walker did in fact violate bis parole by failing to
reside at a residence of record and by cotomitting the offense of Aggravated
Robbery, the coonission of the Robbery having been established at the
Evidentiary Bearing htrein*
6. Either of said violations is individually sufficient, without the
otherf to revoke the Parole of Thayne Larry Walker.
7. Any Finding of Fact which should be deemed a Conclusion of Law is
hereby adopted as such.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parole granted Thayne Larry Walker on the 25th
day of July, 1989, be and the sasre is hereby revoked. The isatter will be
ahceduled for a Rehearing in September, 1996.

Dated this 4»+4ay of Afffcli' 1993.

CURTIS L.
Board Member
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This is to certify that on the 3rd day of August, 1993, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law was sent via fax transmission, pre-paid, to:
1-375-0704:
Hark Stringer
Attorney at Law
Cotton Tree Square, Suite 9-D
2230 North University Avenue Parkway
Provo, Utah 84604
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